








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Suijs, J. P. M. (1999). Price Uncertainty in Linear Production Situations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-
91). Accounting.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021




This paper analyzes linear production situations with price uncertainty, and shows that
the corrresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows
that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments
in financial assets, fit into this framework. For this subclass, the paper provides a proce-
dure to construct an optimal investment portfolio. Furthermore it provides necessary and
sufficient conditions for the proportional rule to result in a core-allocation.
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Production processes are classic examples of situations where several parties recognize the
benefits of cooperation. The owners of the production factors labor, resources, capital, and
technology join forces to deliver a product or a service that is valued more by consumers than
their separate inputs. The value that is added by production is the benefit of cooperation and
has to be divided between the parties that are involved in the production process.
Owen (1975) was the first to analyze this problem from a game theoretical point of
view. In his model, agents have their own individual bundle of resources which they can
use as inputs for a publicly available linear production technology. The resulting output can
be sold on the market for given prices. In this situation, agents can individually use their
resources to maximize the proceeds from production, but they can probably do better if they
cooperate with each other and combine their resources. For instance, an agent that lacks certain
inputs for production, prefers cooperating with agents that possess the required inputs, so that
production can take place. Owen (1975) shows that the corresponding linear production games
are totally balanced. In particular, he shows that a core-allocation arises if each agent receives
the marginal value of his resources. Here, the marginal value of a resource is the marginal
revenue generated by one extra unit of this resource.
The analysis of Owen (1975) as well as most subsequent studies on this subject, confine
themselves to a deterministic setting. Real production, however, typically features uncertainty.
Due to irregularities in the production process, the quality of produced output may not always
be up to standard so that production losses may occur. If this is the case, there is uncertainty
about the output. Similarly, when production takes a considerable amount of time, there is
uncertainty about the price at the moment that the production decision is made.
Sandsmark (1999) examines the cooperative behavior in a two stage production model
with uncertainty about the output. The first stage production plan is determined under un-
certainty while the second stage production plan may be contingent on the realized state of
nature. It is shown that the resulting cooperative game, in which coalitions maximize a certain
revenuefunction, has a nonempty core. Furthermore, a specific core-allocation is provided.
Similar to chance-constrained games (cf. Charnes and Granot (1973)), this model does not
explicitly take into account the individual preferences of the agents. The revenuefunction,
however, may be interpreted as the sum of individual expected utilities.
In contrast to Sandsmark (1999), this paper analyzes linear production situations with
price uncertainty. When agents decide upon their production plan, prices are still unknown. As
a result, price volatility may play a role in deciding how agents use their resources. For instance,
they may use their resources to produce different outputs so as to reduce the variability in total
revenues. We model linear production situations with price uncertainty by means of stochastic
cooperative games and show that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are
balanced. For an extensive discussion of stochastic cooperative games we refer to Suijs (1999).
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Linear production games with price uncertainty can be used to describe investment problems,
where agents can apply their (individual) capital to invest in financial assets whose future value
is uncertain at the time of investment. We discuss this application more detailed in a separate
section.
2 Stochastic Cooperative games
Let us first recall some of the definitions concerning stochastic cooperative games as introduced
by Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1999). A stochastic cooperative game is described
by a tuple   = (N; fXSgSN ; f igi2N), where N is the set of agents, XS the nonempty set
of random payoffs coalition S can obtain, and i the preference relation of agent i over the
set L1(IR) of stochastic payoffs with finite expectation. We assume that for each agent the
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous1. The class of all cooperative games with
stochastic payoffs with agent set N is denoted by SG(N). For a more extensive discussion of
this model and some examples we refer to Suijs et al. (1999) and Suijs, De Waegenaere and
Borm (1998).
An allocation of a stochastic payoff XS 2 XS to coalition S is described by a pair
(d; r) 2 IRS  IRS such that
P
i2S di  0 and
P
i2S ri = 1 and ri  0 for all i 2 S. The payoff
to agent i 2 S according to the allocation (d; r) equals di + riXS . The set of all allocations
for coalition S is denoted by Z (S).
The core of a stochastic cooperative game is defined as follows. Let   2 SG(N)
and (di + riXN )i2N 2 Z (N). Then the allocation (di + riXN )i2N is a core allocation for
the game   if for each coalition S there is no allocation ( ~di + ~riXN )i2S 2 Z (S) such that
~di + ~riXS i di + riXS for all i 2 S. The set of all core allocations for   is denoted by C( ).
Next, consider preferences f igi2N such that for each i 2 N there exists a function
mi : L1(IR)! IR satisfying
(M1) for all X;Y 2 L1(IR) : X iY if and only if mi(X)  mi(Y );
(M2) for all X 2 L1(IR) and all d 2 IR: mi(d+X) = d +mi(X).
The interpretation is that mi(X) equals the amount of moneym for which agent i is indifferent
between receiving the amount mi(X) with certainty and receiving the stochastic payoff X .
The amount mi(X) is called the certainty equivalent of X . Condition (M1) states that agent
i weakly prefers one stochastic payoff to another one if and only if the certainty equivalent
of the former is greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent of the latter. Condition (M2)
states that the certainty equivalent is linearly separable in the deterministic amount of money
1The preferences  are continuous if for all X 2 L
1(IR) the sets fY 2 L1(IR)jY Xg and fY 2
L1(IR)jY Xg are closed.
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d. The class of all stochastic coopertive games satisfying conditions (M1) and (M2) is denoted
by MG(N).
Example 1 Consider the preferences based on a utility function of the form U(t) = e t,
(t 2 IR), where  < 0 and  > 0. The certainty equivalent of X 2 L1(IR) can be defined by
m(X) = U 1(E(U(X))). It is easy to check that m satisfies condition (M1). For condition





; t < 0 and
m(d+X) = U 1(E(U(d+X)))























The following theorem regarding nonemptiness of the core is due to Suijs and Borm
(1999).




mi(d̂i + r̂iX̂)j (d̂i + r̂iX̂)i2S 2 Z (S)
)
;
for all S  N .
3 Stochastic Linear Production Games
Let N  IN denote the set of agents, R  IN the set of resources, and M  IN the set
of consumption goods. By assumption, each agent i 2 N is a risk averse expected utility
maximizer with utility functionUi(t) = ie it, where i < 0 and i > 0. Let bi 2 IR
R
+ denote
agent i’s endowment of resources, and let Ai 2 IRRM denote the linear production technology
of agent i. This means that for the production of an output bundle c 2 IRR+ the inputsA
ic 2 IRM+
are needed. Note that this generalizes Owen (1975), since in that case each agent has access to
the same technology A 2 IRRM . The resources can be used to produce consumption goods.
The prices at which these goods can be sold, are denoted by random variables Pj 2 L1(IR+),
j 2M , and are assumed to be mutually independent.
When coalition S forms, the members of S pool their resources and production tech-
nologies, so that they possess the resources
P
i2S b
i and have access to the technologies Ai,
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i 2 S. Let ci 2 IRR+ denote the consumption bundle that coalition S plans to produce with
the production technology Ai of agent i 2 S. Then a production plan c 2 IRR+ is feasible for










i. The set of feasible production plans














Each feasible production plan c 2 C(S) yields stochastic revenues
P
j2M Pjcj . Now, we can
describe a linear production situation with price uncertainty by the following stochastic linear







 c 2 C(S)
9=
; (2)
for all S  N and i the preferences induced by Ui, for each i 2 N . The set of all stochastic
linear production games is denoted by SLP (N).
Example 1 implies that stochastic linear production games belong to the class MG(N).
Hence, for our analysis we may focus on certainty equivalents. Therefore, let   2 SLP (N)
be a stochastic linear production game. Then, given a feasible production plan c 2 C(S), the







is for each agent i 2 S equal to
mi
0




























where the second equality follows from the independence of (Pj)j2M . The corresponding















i2S ri = 1;
ri  0; for all i 2 S;
c 2 C(S);
(3)
for all S  N .
We cannot explicitly determine an optimal production plan c 2 C(S). What we can do
though, is determine the Pareto optimal allocation r of the random revenue
P
j2M Pjcj , while
taking the production plan c 2 C(S) as given.
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Proposition 1 Let   2 SLP (N) and let c 2 C(S) be a feasible production plan for coalition







is a Pareto optimal allocation of the revenueP








for all i 2 S.




j2M Pjcj)i2S is Pareto















i2S ri = 1;
ri  0; for alli 2 S:
From Lemma 1 with c =  icj and x = ri it follows that the objective function is strictly
concave, so that the optimal solution is unique. That r is indeed the unique solution follows

















iri = 0; for all i 2 S;
















Note that more risk averse agents bear a larger part of the risk. Furthermore, note that
the Pareto optimal allocation r is independent of the production plan c 2 C(S), so that r also
yields a Pareto optimal allocation for the optimal production plan.
2 The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions read as follows:
If f(x) = maxy f(y)
s.t. gk(y)  0; k 2 K
gl(y) = 0; l 2 L
then there exist k  0 (8k 2 K) and l 2 IR (8l 2 L) such that
rf(x) =
P
k2K k  rgk(x) +
P
l2L l  rgl(x)
k  gk(x) = 0, for all k 2 K:
Moreover, if f is strictly concave and gk (k 2 K), gl (l 2 L) are convex then the reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.
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The following theorem shows that stochastic linear production games are totally bal-
anced.
Theorem 2 Each stochastic linear production game   2 SLP (N) is totally balanced.
PROOF: Let   2 SLP (N). Since each subgame  jS 2 SLP (S), it suffices to show that   is
balanced. From Theorem 2 we know that it suffices to show that the TU-game (N; v ) has a
nonempty core. For this, we apply the well-known result of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley










 1 c 2 C(S)
9=
; : (5)
Second, let  be a balanced map3 and denote the optimal production plan for coalition S by
cS 2 C(S). In particular, let (cS;i)i2S be such that
P
i2S c


























































































(N) = 1 and Lemma 1, which states that the




























3A balanced map l is a function  : IR2
N
! IR+ such that
P
i2N (S) = 1 for all i 2 N .
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where the first and second inequality follow from (6) and
P
SN (S)c
S 2 C(N), respectively.
2
With deterministic prices, a core-allocation can be found by appropriately valuating the
different resources, and giving each agent the total value of his own resource bundle. To see
how this process works, recall that a deterministic linear production game (N; v) (cf. Owen




















Let  2 IRR+ be the optimal solution of the dual problem. Then k represents the marginal
value of resource k, that is one extra unit of resource k raises the value v(N) with k . One can
interpret k as the monetary value of owning one unit of resource k, and
P
k2R kbk as the total
value of owning the resource bundle b 2 IRR+. Owen (1975) shows that a core-allocation arises





k of his individual resource bundle b
i.
This naturally raises the question if we can construct core-allocations in a similar way






is a core-allocation for the stochastic linear production game (N; v ) as
defined in (3) and (5).
Example 3 Consider the following two person stochastic linear production game  2 SLP (N),
with 1 = 0:1, 2 = 10, A = [1], b1 = 0:1, b2 = 1, and P1 exponentially distributed with
parameter 0:5. Note that the production technology uses one unit of input to produce one unit
of output. The corresponding TU-game (N; v ) equals v (f1g) = 0:198, v (f2g) = 1:019,
and v (f1; 2g) = 1:990. Now, let   0 denote the monetary value of the single resource. If
(b1; b2) belongs to the core of (N; v ), it holds that b1 = 0:1  0:198 = v (f1g), b2 =
  1:019 = v (f2g), and b1 + b2 = 1:1 = 1:990 = v (f1; 2g). Since the first inequality
implies that   1:98, we obtain the contradiction that 1:1  2:178 > 1:990 = v (f1; 2g).
Hence, we cannot obtain a core-allocation by appropriately valuating the resource.
Theorem 4 Let   2 SLP (N). If the resource bundles (bi)i2N are linearly independent, then
there exists a vector  2 IRR such that (>bi)i2N 2 C(v ).











By using a variant of Farka’s Lemma4, such  exists if and only if there exist no   0,











 (S)v (S) + v (N) < 0:












Since (S)  0, v (S)  0 for all S  N , and bi  0 for all i 2 N , it follows that  > 0.
Hence, without loss of generality we may assume that  = 1, that is there exist no (S)  0


















i has a unique
solution zi = 1 for all i 2 N . This implies that
P
SN :i2S (S) = zi = 1 for all i 2 N , and
hence, that  is a balanced map. The balancedness of (N; v ) then yields the contradictionP
SN (S)v (S)  v (N). Conclusion, there exists a vector  2 IR
R satisfying (8). 2
Although linear independence is a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of an
appropriate valuation scheme of the resources, this result cannot be obtained without allowing
for negative monetary values, as the following example shows.


















Note that the second resource is not needed for production, so that the corresponding TU-game
(N; v ) is the same as in Example 3. Since the resource bundles are linearly independent, we
can find values  = (1; 2) such that (>b1; >b2) 2 C(v ). Recall that 1  1:98 and that
>b1 + >b2 = 1:11 + 2 = v (f1; 2g) = 1:99. Since 2 = 1:99   1:11   0:188, the
superfluous resource must have a negative monetary value.
4The system Ax  b has a solution x if and only if there exists no y  0 such that y>A = 0 and y>b < 0.
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4 Financial Games
The fact that retail prices are uncertain when individuals decide upon their production plan, is
particularly applicable to investment funds. For at the time that people invest their capital in
financial assets, they are not sure about the future value of this asset. To reduce the volatility
of the total returns, they may prefer to participate in an investment fund to obtain a more
diversified portfolio.
Besides reducing volatility, people may also benefit from cooperation if the return varies
with the amount of capital invested. Bank deposits, for instance, usually earn a higher interest
rate when more capital is deposited. These problems were introduced by Lemaire (1983) and
further analyzed by Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) and Borm, De Waegenaere, Rafels, Suijs, Tijs
and Timmer (1999). The latter extended the former model by considering several periods so
as to include term- dependent interest rates. In contrast to the model we present here, the three
previous models abstract from risk bearing investments. Instead, they assume that the earned
interest rates are known with certainty beforehand.
In the financial games we consider, there is a society N  IN of risk averse expected
utility maximizing agents, each having a utility function of the form Ui(t) = ie it with
i < 0 and i > 0. Each agent has capital !i 2 IR+ available for investments in several,
infinitely divisible risky assets M  IN. For each asset j 2 M , let j 2 IR+ denote the asset
price, Rj 2 L1(IR+) the random future value, and qj 2 IR+ the quantity purchased. Then a
portfolio q 2 IRM+ of assets is feasible for coalition S  N if they have sufficient capital at









j2M Rjqj . Since agents are not forced to invest all their capital in risky assets, we
must assume that there is a riskless asset j0 2 M that earns the risk-free interest rate r  0.
Furthermore, we may assume without loss of generality that j0 = 1.
















for all S  N , where the preferences i are induced by Ui. The class of financial games is
denoted by FG(N).
It is a straightforward exercise to see that FG(N)  SLP (N). For investing in a risky
asset can be described by a simple production technology, that uses a single resource, i.e.
capital, to produce several commodities, i.e. financial assets. The production technology is
determined by the asset prices (j)j2M : the asset price j denotes how much of the resource
capital is needed to produce one unit of asset j 2M . The prices at which produced output can
be sold are the random returns Rj . Hence, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1 Each financial game   2 FG(N) is totally balanced.
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4.1 The Optimal Investment Portfolio
The relatively simple production technology in financial games enables us to provide a more
detailed analysis of the optimal investment portfolio. Using the Pareto optimality result of















qj  0; for all j 2M:
(10)
Recall that there is a risk-free asset j0 yielding the risk-free interest rate r  0. Hence, (10) is
equivalent to














qj  0; for all j 2M;
where M0 = Mnfj0g. Instead of focusing on the quantities, we can also focus on the capital
invested in each asset. For this purpose, let wj = jqj denote the capital invested in asset
j 2M . Then substituting qj = wj=j yields














wj  0; for all j 2M:


















wj  0; for all j 2M:
Since coalition S prefers investing in the risk-free asset to not investing at all, all the capital












































wj  0; for all j 2M0:























wj  0; for all j 2M0:
11































MRIj(xj) represents the marginal return on investment in terms of certainty equivalents that
coalition S receives from investing an additional dollar in the risky asset j 2 M0, when they
have already invested xj dollars in asset j. Note that the marginal return is decreasing5 in
the capital invested. Similarly, r represents the cost of capital, that is the marginal return of
investing an additional dollar in the risk-free asset. In order to maximize the the total return, a
coalition should invest in the asset with the largest marginal return on investment that exceeds
the cost of capital. If such investments do not exist, the remaining capital should be invested
in the risk-free asset. Hence, we can construct the optimal portfolio in the following way.
When no investments have been made, that is xj = 0 for all j 2 M0, the marginal return





Assuming that MRIj1(0) > MRIj2(0) > : : : > MRIjm(0), it is optimal to invest in asset j1.
As the capital xj1 invested in asset j1 increases, the marginal returnMRIj1(xj1) decreases, and
either one of the following three things will happen: the capital runs out, the marginal return
becomes equal to the cost of capital, or the marginal benefit becomes equal to MRIj2(0).
In the first case, the current investments make up the optimal portfolio, while in the second
case, the remaining capital is invested in the risk-free asset. In the third case, it is optimal
to start investing in both asset j1 and asset j2. The quantities xj1 and xj2 , however, must
be chosen such that the marginal returns of both assets remain equal to each other, that is
MRIj1(xj1) = MRIj2(xj2). Again, as the investments increase, the marginal returns decrease
simultaneously, and either of the following three things will happen: the capital runs out, the
marginal return of both assets becomes equal to the cost of capital, or the marginal return
becomes equal to MRIj3(0). The procedure continues in a similar way until either the capital
runs out, or the marginal return of all assets in the portfolio equals the cost of capital.
Let us illustrate this procedure with an example.
Example 2 Consider two individuals with 1 = 0:1 and 2 = 0:05, who can invest their
individual capital of $ 2 and $ 4 in three risky assets and a risk-free asset. The risk-free interest




rate is 10%. The future value of the risky assets is exponentially distributed with expected
return of $ 4, $ 6, and $ 8:1, respectively, while the current asset prices are $ 3, $ 5, and $ 8,





for all xj  0. The optimal portfolio for coalition S = f1; 2g is now constructed as follows.












  1 = 0:013:
Since asset 1 has the largest marginal return, coalition S starts with investing in asset 1 and
increases this investment until MRI1(x1) = MRI2(0), which happens at x1 = 2:500. They











They increase the investments x1 and x2 until the available capital of $ 6 is used up. Then
x1 = 4:250 and x2 = 1:750. Note that for the current portfolio, the marginal return on
investmentMRI1(4:250) = MRI2(1:750) = 0:1215 still exceeds the cost of capital r = 0:100.
Thus, coalition S would like to invest more in asset j1 and asset j2, but is constrained by its
capital budget. Then the optimal investment portfolio equals w = (4:250; 1:750; 0), or
q = (1:417; 0:350; 0) if stated in quantities.
Proposition 3 Let   2 FG(N) be a financial game and let q 2 IRM0+ be the optimal portfolio
for coalition S  N . Then




(b) qj > 0 if there exists k 2M0 such that q







PROOF: Let   2 FG(N) and S  N . From (11) it follows that coalition S does certainly
not invest any capital in asset j if MRIj(xj)  r for all xj  0. Since the marginal return







MRIj(0) < r, which proves (1).
In order to prove (2), let MRIj1(0) > MRIj2(0) > : : : > MRIjm (0). Recall that in
the construction of the optimal portfolio, coalition S starts with investing in asset j1, continues
with investing in asset j1 and asset j2, and so on. Thus, if MRIj(0) > MRIk(0) and wk > 0,








Summarizing, a coalition will not invest in assets with an expected return on investment
lower than the cost of capital, that is E(Rj) j
j
 r. Furthermore, it is the asset’s expected return
on investment that determines whether or not a coalition should invest in it. The variability
in the asset’s return only plays a role in determining the quantity that is invested. Consider,
for example, the following two assets. Asset 1 has a price of $ 90 and yields $ 1000 with
probability 0:55 and $   1000 with probability 0:45. Asset 2 has a price of $ 90 and yields
$ 99 with certainty. Since the expected return of asset 1 exceeds the expected return of asset 2
by 1:11%, it is optimal to start investing in asset 1, although it involves (much) more risk than
asset 2.
4.2 The Proportional Rule
The proportional rule is most commonly used by investment funds to allocate the returns to
the participants in the fund. This means that if an investment fund generates a rate of return
of 12%, each individual participant earns 12% on the amount of capital that he contributed to
the fund. So, the individual rate of return does not depend on the amount of capital brought in.
Izquierdo and Rafels (1996) and Borm et al. (1999) show that the proportional rule results in a
core-allocation for deposit games, in which the rate of return is risk-free and dependent on the
term and the amount of the bank deposit. For the class of financial games introduced in this
section, however, the proportional allocation-rule does not perform as well.
Let   2 FG(N) be a financial game and let qN 2 IRM+ denote the optimal portfolio. We
start with considering the proportional rule for the corresponding TU-game (N; v ). In terms

















for all i 2 N .
The proportional rule , however, is not proportional in the sense that each individual





j . Since we considered the TU-game













instead of ri = !i!(N) , for all i 2 N . It is the certainty equivalent of this Pareto optimal allocation














for all i; k 2 N .
Theorem 4 Let   2 FG(N). Then  2 C(v ) if and only if !i(fig) =
!k
(fkg)
for all i; k 2 N .

















































































is a feasible portfolio for coalition
N , and the second equality follows from !(S)
!(N)





















































































where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality, !(S)(N)
!(N)(S)
< 1, andRj nondegenerate








feasible portfolio for coalition S. Hence,  62 C(v ). 2
5 Remarks
First, note that the results presented in this paper still go through if we replace mutual inde-
pendency of (Pj)j2M by the assumption that the covariance matrix of the retail prices (Pj)j2M
is negative definite.
Second, in this paper we only discussed price uncertainty, but the stochastic linear
production game also applies to situations where there is uncertainty in the production process
due to production losses. Production losses may occur when produced output does not satisfy
prespecified (quality) standards. We can express these losses as a percentage of the production
plan. Consider, for instance, a producer of audio and video tapes, and suppose that production
losses are 2% for audio tapes and 0:7% for video tapes. Then given a feasible production plan
c 2 IR2+, the proceeds are 0:98paca + 0:993pvcv .
Fall out of production, however, is generally uncertain at the start of production. Let
1   X ij denote the stochastic percentage of production losses of commodity j when using
technology i, and let pj denote the deterministic retail price of good j 2 M . Given a feasible




























for all S  N , and i induced by Ui for each i 2 N . Note that this model can easily be
written in terms of a stochastic linear production game by considering cij and c
k
j , i 6= k, as two
different commodities. Hence, they are totally balanced as well.
Appendix
Lemma 1 Let c 2 IRnf0g and let F be a probability distribution function corresponding to a
































































 0, it follows that hc is concave. The lemma then follows
from the observation that the inequality is binding if and only if F corresponds to a degenerate
random variable. 2
Lemma 2 Let c 2 IRnf0g and let F be a probability distribution function corresponding to a










































hc is decreasing. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, the result follows from the observation that
the inequality is binding if and only if F corresponds to a degenerate random variable. 2
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